like-to implement constitutional (and other) values. 6 Proponents of this approach cite three related virtues. The first is that such canons permit effective enforcement of otherwise underenforced constitutional values. Nondelegation canons thus assume that even if official action does not squarely offend an express constitutional guarantee, it might nonetheless intrude upon widely shared background constitutional values 7 -such as the decentralization of power in a federal system, the rule of law values implicit in statutory prospectivity, or the separation-of-powers values served by confining the presumptive territorial sweep of federal lawmaking.
The second-and closely related-advantage is that the values canons do their work not by displacing congressional decisions, but rather by using interpretive rules of thumb to promote congressional responsibility. Congress can displace traditional state authority, impose retroactive liability, or project its power overseas as long as it decides to do so explicitly. What it cannot do is duck responsibility for such choices by delegating to agencies or courts vague or ambiguous authority that apparently permits but does not expressly prescribe such results. By implementing constitutional values in this way, nondelegation canons purport to avoid the brute force of Marbury- 5 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting that the extraterritoriality canon "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord").
6 Among his compilation of nondelegation canons, Professor Sunstein also lists canons that promote conceptions of sovereignty (such as the canon requiring liberal construction of statutes and treaties in favor of Native American tribes) and those that promote generally held public policy commitments (such as the canon requiring narrow construction of tax exemptions). See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 322-35. As discussed below, this Essay will not focus on the derivation of the subjects protected by these nondelegation canons, but rather on their administrability. See infra note 17 and accompanying text. Although not central to the analysis, I believe that the canons affecting sovereignty are properly understood within the framework of constitutionally inspired canons; questions of sovereignty go to the relative allocation of authority in our system of government.
7 Professor Ernest Young, who favors such canons, sees no reason to believe that " [t] he force of a constitutional value ... is exhausted by the set of cases in which that value would require invalidation of a conflicting statute." Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation ofJudicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1549, 1593-94 (2000) . As Professor Young notes, if one views the canon of avoidance as a resistance norm, it makes sense that " [t] he constitutional value would be protected even in cases in which the 'right answer' to the constitutional question would require that the statute be upheld." Id. at 1589. style judicial review, with all of the countermajoritarian anxiety that it produces."
The third asserted virtue (which will be this Essay's focus) is this: within their spheres of operation, nondelegation canons have the collateral benefit of promoting congressional responsibility for lawmaking without the judicial manageability problems that have dissuaded the Court from enforcing the nondelegation doctrine directly by invalidating statutes that confer excessive discretion upon executors. 9 In particular, the Court has made it abundantly clear that the constitutional structure forbids the delegation of legislative power to courts or agencies.i 0 Yet it has almost never implemented that conviction 8 Hence, even if the underlying constitutional norm is not sharply delineated, the canons should not trigger standard countermajoritarian-dilemma concerns: "[t] he relevant canons operate as nondelegation principles, and they are designed to ensure that Congress decides certain contested questions on its own. If this idea is a core structural commitment of the Constitution, there can be no problem with its judicial enforcement." Sunstein, supra note 1, at 338. 10 See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) ("The fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine is that the lawmaking function belongs to Congress and may not be conveyed to another branch or entity." (citation omitted)); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991) ("The Constitution provides that '[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.' From this language the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine: that Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of Government." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1)). The Court has explained, moreover, that the Constitution vests lawmaking authority in Congress because of that body's unique qualities. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 757-58 ("Article I's precise rules of representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch most capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking.").
Recently, an informative debate has developed around the basic question of whether the nondelegation doctrine has a constitutional foundation. The Court has candidly attributed this reticence to anxiety about its own competence to judge when a statute is so vague or open-ended that it effectively transfers legislative power to an agency or court.
13
Because all statutory language is more or less open textured, the Court acknowledges that some discretion inheres in the implementation of any statute.
14 In the absence of any judicially manageable standard for identifying how much is too much, the Court has "'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law. ) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Manning, supra note 9, at 241-42 (discussing the judicial competence concern); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 326-28 (same). Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that same concern in the early days of the Republic:
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter unnecessarily. upon a congressional choice-without requiring judges to decide, in the abstract, whether the underlying statute has assigned the agency too much discretion. 16 Although scholars have repeatedly raised concerns about the pedigree and derivation of some of the constitutional (and other) "values" that trigger what we now call nondelegation canons, 17 less has been said about whether such canons can, in fact, achieve the accountability-forcing goals of the traditional nondelegation doctrine without producing the corresponding judicial administrability problems. The subject of this Symposium-Professor Clark's Supremacy Clause exclusivity thesis-sharply poses the latter question by providing an explicit constitutional source for one of the most important nondelegation canons: the presumption against preemp- Each such procedure thus conditions the adoption of its specified legal text on the assent of a majority or supermajority of the Senate, a supermajority of the states, or both. See Clark, supra note 19, at 1344-46. The Supremacy Clause's adoption coincided exactly with the Great Compromise providing for equal state representation in the Senate-further reinforcing the premise that the forms of law specified in the Supremacy Clause were meant to tap into processes in which the interests of the small states received explicit and disproportionate protection. See id. at 1352-55; see also Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1421 (2008) (elaborating on the apparent connection between the compromises that gave rise to equal representation in the Senate and the adoption of the Supremacy Clause).
Section 7 reflect the exclusive means for adopting preemptive "Laws," then any congressional attempt to delegate power to preempt would circumvent the procedural safeguards of federalism prescribed by the Supremacy Clause. Since the Court has made clear, however, that there is no judicially manageable standard for enforcing any resulting nondelegation doctrine directly, 2 1 a nondelegation canon requiring a "clear and manifest" statutory purpose to preempt nicely and manageably serves the same end.
22
Because preemption doctrine has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years, 23 Clause thesis gives the presumption against preemption a firm (though not unassailable) constitutional grounding, 24 that nondelegation canon seems to offer a particularly suitable context for posing some questions about the judicial manageability or administrability of such canons more generally. 25 In that vein, this Essay will argue that nondelegation canons present the same line-drawing problems as the traditional nondelegation doctrine because they require courts to identify when an interpretive decision is properly attributed to "a Law" passed by Congress or to policymaking discretion exercised by an
give some, but ultimately rather limited, deference to agency determinations that state law should be preempted). . Clark also notes that, even if "Laws of any State" were read to encompass common law, the Clause's initial reference to "Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance" of the Constitution could not be read to refer to common law because (unlike statutes) such law was not understood to be "made." See id. at 1686-87. Any attempt to resolve this or the many other interesting points of difference between the two lies well beyond this Essay's scope. For purposes of triggering the present inquiry into the presumption against preemption as a nondelegation canon, it suffices to note that Professor Clark's thesis represents a substantial account of important structural, functional, and political elements of a compromise that yielded both the Supremacy Clause and a number of lawmaking procedures that fit coherently with its text and apparent design. Indeed, although not grounding the conclusion in the Supremacy Clause, others have defended the presumption against preemption as a nondelegation canon. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 331 (describing the nondelegation effect of the presumption as "an important requirement in light of the various safeguards against cavalier disregard of state interests created by the system of state representation in Congress").
25 The question of 'judicial manageability" of course pervades constitutional adjudication and carries rich and complex connotations. agency or court. Since all federal statutes confer some degree of discretion upon the courts or agencies that implement them, applying a nondelegation canon will still ultimately come down to hard-to-define judgments about whether a statute has conferred too much policymaking discretion upon the entity charged with implementing it. Perhaps as a result of this problem, the Supreme Court is prone to articulate a canon like the presumption against preemption as a "clear statement rule," which more manageably assigns the full burden of ambiguity to those who would preempt-but, in so doing, goes well beyond any plausible traditional understanding of nondelegation. In addition, I suggest that even when a nondelegation canon is framed as a clear statement rule, it may be hard for judges to maintain a posture in which they must sometimes conclude that the best answer to a statutory question is, say, preemption, but the result is simply not clear enough to warrant enforcement. Hence, judges may end up doing something that looks a lot like everyday, boring statutory interpretation, even when putatively enforcing a nondelegation canon.
This Essay will use the presumption against preemption to raise more general questions about the judicial administrability of nondelegation canons. After laying some groundwork in statutory interpretation theory, Part II elaborates on why nondelegation canons generally present judicial administrability concerns analogous to those associated with the nondelegation doctrine. It then discusses ways in which these administrability problems might affect thejudiciary's implementation of the presumption against preemption. Part III examines whether nondelegation cannons can provide a judicially administrable solution to at least part of the puzzle of how to structure judicial review of agency action when an agency wishes to preempt state law.
I. NONDELEGATION CANONS AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRABILITY
This Part asks whether a nondelegation canon presents problems of judicial administrability similar to those that have doomed the traditional nondelegation doctrine. My thesis is simple: a nondelegation canon, by definition, seeks to ascertain whether an interpretive decision is properly attributed to congressional choice or to what, for convenience, I will call "executory discretion"-the policymaking discretion exercised by the entity primarily responsible for implementing the statute. For familiar reasons, however, this will be difficult (if not impossible) to define in a principled way. All laws leave some element of discretion to those who put them into effect. So, at least at the margins, almost all interpretive decisions will involve some combination of congressional choice and executory discretion. The necessary line drawing by courts applying a nondelegation canon may therefore end up feeling quite similar to the line drawing needed to give meaningful effect to the traditional nondelegation doctrine.
In this Part, I first address the conceptual difficulty in identifying a meaningful line between congressional choice and impermissible delegation. I speculate about the coincidence of that line drawing difficulty with certain widely understood features of the presumption against preemption-including the Court's tendency to articulate that canon as a clear statement rule and its difficulty implementing it in a consistent manner.
Before turning to the specifics, however, I should note that although Professor Sunstein takes care to limit his endorsement of nondelegation canons to contexts involving judicial review of agency action, 26 my analysis in this Part will adopt the simplifying assumption of a single interpreter, such as a court that must make a preemption determination under a statute that grants a private right of action. Putting to one side my own sense that the concept of nondelegation canons applies no less to judicially administered statutes, 2 7 I adopt this assumption because one can more easily isolate the underlying line drawing problem without the added complication of the scope ofjudicial review. In Part III, however, I do draw on the resulting analysis to examine nondelegation canons in the judicial-review-of-agency-action context in which Professor Sunstein developed his themes. 26 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 340. 27 Under Professor Sunstein's premises, nondelegation canons instruct reviewing courts to use tools of construction to ensure that decisions in sensitive areas properly reflect congressional choice rather than agency discretion. See id. at 338. Even the most formalist ofjudges would acknowledge that when judges interpret ambiguous or open-ended statutes, they properly exercise policymaking discretion as well. Cf Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 515 (arguing that the traditional tools of construction used by courts frequently involve "judicial consideration and evaluation of competing policies"). Hence, the goals of the nondelegation canon framework would seem to apply no less when the issue is whether a sensitive decision is more properly attributed to congressional choice or judicial discretion. Along these lines, I note that the Court does not confine the presumption against preemption to agency-administered statutes; that canon also plainly applies to cases in which a judge makes the primary decision whether and to what extent a statute preempts. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (1994) (using the presumption to analyze whether the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 preempts a state property tax as applied to railroads); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (invoking the presumption to decide whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act preempts a state tort action); Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (applying the presumption in connection with a determination of whether the Federal Warehouse Act preempts various state law regulatory requirements for the storage of grain).
A. Interpretation, Ambiguity, and Matters of Degree
In thinking about the judicial manageability of nondelegation canons, it is helpful to compare modem assumptions about the traditional nondelegation doctrine with those about statutory interpretation. Recall first the institutional concerns that the Court has invoked when justifying its reluctance (or, more accurately, refusal) to enforce the traditional nondelegation doctrine through Marbury-style judicial review. Because "no statute can be entirely precise," it is now wellaccepted "that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it.
'' 2 8 Accordingly, "'[a] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action.'"29 For this reason, the Court has "'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law."' 30 The question in the standard, garden-variety nondelegation casehow much discretion is too much-simply does not lend itself to principled line drawing. The same difficulty troubles the alternative of enforcing nondelegation principles through interpretive canons. Nondelegation canons aim to make Congress take responsibility for a choice that cuts against some constitutional or quasi-constitutional value-including the choice to preempt state law, to impose retroactive liability, or to project federal legislative authority overseas. But how does one tell whether Congress has, in fact, expressed such a decision? Few (if any) now believe that the task of interpretation entails recovering intrinsic "plain meaning[s]" from within "the four corners" of a statute. 31 Modern language theory tells us instead that words have meaning because a relevant linguistic community applies an array of shared 28 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (ScaliaJ., dissenting). The idea that all enacted texts will have some degree of indeterminacy has deep roots in our history. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *62 (noting that "in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed"); THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications."); see also H.L.A. HART 239, 244 (1992) (noting that the success of a piece of legislation often depends on "idiosyncratic, structural, procedural, and strategic factors, which are at best tenuously related to normative principles embraced by democratic theorists and philosophers"). supremacy suggests that interpretation amounts to the derivation of some form of "constructive intent." 3 6 Simply put, an interpreter's job is to decode legislative instructions according to shared social and linguistic conventions. As Jeremy Waldron puts it:
A legislator who votes for (or against) a provision like "No vehicle shall be permitted to enter any state or municipal park" does so on the assumption that-to put it crudely-what the words mean to him is identical to what they will mean to those to whom they are addressed (in the event that the provision is passed) ....
That such assumptions pervade the legislative process shows how much law depends on language, on the shared conventions that constitute a language, and on the reciprocity of intentions that conventions comprise. On that theory, even in the absence of plain meaning or actual intent, it remains possible to attribute an interpreter's decision to legislative choice if one assumes that legislators intend "to say what one would be normally understood as saying, given the circumstances in which one
By ascribing conventional meaning to legislators, this assumption provides an intelligible way to hold them accountable for 36 Even if one starts from a baseline of skepticism about plain meaning or actual legislative intent, some minimal conception of legislative intent is necessary to make sense of a system founded on legislative supremacy. As Joseph Raz has insightfully noted, "It makes no sense to give any person or body law-making power unless it is assumed that the law they make is the law they intended to make." Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 249, 258 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). As he explains:
[T]o assume that the law made by legislation is not the one intended by the legislator, we must assume that he cannot predict what law he is making when the legislature passes any piece of legislation. But if so, why does it matter who the members of the legislature are, whether they are democratically elected or not, whether they represent different regions of the country, or classes in the population, whether they are adults or children, sane or insane? Since the law they will end by making does not represent their intentions, the fact that their intentions are foolish or wise, partial or impartial, self-serving or public spirited, makes no difference. . What gives him this expectation or this hope is his belief that he can anticipate how others (e.g., judges and administrators) will understand these words.").
38 Raz, supra note 36, at 268. whatever bill they have passed, whether or not they have actually formed an intention about its detailed application.
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In other words, interpretive theory now rests on the premise that interpreters filter available materials through applicable conventions to make an approximation of how a reasonable person (viz. reasonable legislator) would have understood the question in issue. 40 Interpreters will have an array of diverse, often conflicting evidence at their disposal: the conventional meanings of statutory language in context, evidence of the special connotations of technical terms of art, inferences from statutory structure, relevant canons of construction (both substantive and semantic), the mischiefs that inspired a statute, the overall tenor of the statute, and the like. 4 1 Although practitioners of the main interpretive approaches that now compete for the Supreme Court's allegiance (textualism and purposivism) would filter the evidence in different ways, the important point is that most modern interpreters try to make a best approximation of what a "reasonable person" applying relevant social and linguistic conventions would infer from evidence of meaning that may cut in more than one direction. 
41
See id. at 79-91 (discussing tools of construction commonly used by the Supreme Court).
42 Methodological differences among the leading approaches are not trivial in practice, but do not affect the analysis of the difficulty of using nondelegation canons. The main dividing line on the present Supreme Court is between textualists, who emphasize the conventional semantic meaning of the enacted texts, and purposivists, who emphasize the goals that Congress sought to pursue in enacting the text. See id. at 91-108 (outlining the distinctions between the two mainstream approaches). Both camps, however, use some version of the "reasonable person" construct to describe the relevant interpretive task. Textualists thus look for the way "a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words" would have understood the statutory language. If that account is correct, then the interpretive process will typically lead not to a "yes" or "no" decision about whether members of the enacting coalition actually preferred alternative x to alternative y, but rather to a probabilistic judgment about how strongly the arrayed evidence cuts in a particular direction under accepted conventions ("I think it sixty percent likely that the statute means x rather than y."). 43 Sometimes the relevant evidence will point so clearly in one direction that the interpretive calculation might almost feel automatic; in that case, the statute is surely clear in context. 44 Sometimes the relevant evidence will make it seem that Congress left no meaningful clue about its interpretive choice; in that case, the resultant decision would seem to hinge very much on the interpreter's executory discretion. 45 But the hard-and, for purposes of line drawing, the most relevant-cases will lie at the margins. With respect to those cases, the important question is this: if we presume that in an ordinary case (i.e., one not governed by a nondelegation canon), it suffices for an interpreter to conclude the evidence more likely than not points to x, then how much more certainty do we need in a case governed by a nondelegation canon? If the answer is "none," the nondelegation canon does no work; it is ordinary interpretation. If the answer is "some" (as it sensibly must be) ,46 then how much additional confiinstructs interpreters to filter the same evidence through the assumption "that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably." HENRY M. HART 474-78 (1985) . One might also find cases, though perhaps rare, in which the relevant evidence of meaning is essentially in equipoise. See Scalia, supra note 27, at 520-21 (arguing that competing interpretations are almost never in equipoise).
46 In other words, courts applying a nondelegation canon must sometimes reject what they regard as the more likely interpretation because it does not meet the higher threshold set by the nondelegation canon. The logical necessity for such an approach has been nicely articulated in the context of a much-studied nondelegation canonthe canon requiring avoidance of serious constitutional questions, where possible. dence is enough? I do not know how to begin to answer that question. My uncertainty, moreover, does not depend upon any belief that interpreters will be unable to make meaningful judgments about the relative strength of competing interpretations-that is, about the probabilities of each alternative, given the available evidence. 47 Rather, the problem is the conceptual one of knowing how to describe the degree of certainty needed to cross some imaginary line between congressional choice and executory discretion: if most proffered interpretations of statutes leave some residue of ambiguity or doubt in the interpreter's mind, how much is too much? 48 As with the questions of degree that have dissuaded the judiciary from enforcing the traditional nondelegation doctrine, there is no satisfying answer to that question of degree.
B. Line Drawing, Clear Statements, and Ordinary Interpretation
If the concept of a nondelegation canon does present this sort of judicial manageability problem, it might relate to two phenomena that characterize the presumption-against-preemption case law. First, it may give the Court cause to articulate the presumption as a clear statement rule, pushing the inquiry away from the margins by requir- should think that the effort, with respect to any statute, should be neither liberally to expand nor strictly to constrict its meaning, but rather to get the meaning precisely right. Now that may often be difficult, but I see no reason, a priori, to compound the difficulty, and render it even more unlikely that the precise meaning will be discerned, by laying ajudicial thumb on one or the other side of the scales. And that is particularly so when the thumb is of indeterminate weight. How 'liberal' is liberal, and how 'strict' is strict?").
ing clear evidence of preemptive purpose. Second, the posited manageability concern corresponds with (but may or may not explain) a widely accepted observation that the presumption-against-preemption cases are all over the map. Although detailed examination of the presumption and its implementation lies beyond this Essay's scope, I will begin to explore some possible links between judicial manageability concerns and those features of the case law.
First, the Court has formally articulated the presumption against preemption as a clear statement rule:
In (1963) ("The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained."); Napier v. At. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926) ("The intention of Congress to exclude States from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested."); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902) ("It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested.").
50 Along these lines, Professor Sunstein has equated nondelegation canons with a requirement of statutory clarity. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 330 ("These canons impose important constraints on administrative authority, for agencies are not permitted to understand ambiguous provisions to give them authority to venture in certain directions; a clear congressional statement is necessary."); see also, e.g., id. at 316 (noting that such canons provide that "federal administrative agencies may not engage in certain activities unless and until Congress has expressly authorized them to do so"); id. (noting that under the canon of avoidance, "Congress must clearly assert its desire to venture into the disputed terrain"); id. at 332 (noting that a civil statute will be applied retroactively only if Congress has made "that choice explicitly"); id. (noting that the rule of lenity requires the imposition of criminal sanctions to reflect "a clear judgment on Congress's part").
51 See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1543-46 (2007) (Breyer, J.) (finding the term "percentile" ambiguous because the statute did 2oo81 against which to argue about clarity: if all or almost all of those conversant with applicable social and linguistic conventions would agree upon a statute's meaning, the outcome can be said to be clear in context. 52 In such a case, where almost all interpreters (sharing a common methodology) would agree that the evidence points decisively in one direction, only the most dedicated rule skeptics would hesitate to attribute the resultant interpretation to Congress. 53 In short, if the very idea of a nondelegation canon requires a standard higher than ordinary interpretation, then a clear statement may be the only meaningful stopping point.
Assuming that one can successfully implement such a clear statement rule for preemption, the resulting regime would effectively assign the whole burden of statutory uncertainty to those who would preempt. That is, even if one could plausibly ascribe preemption to congressional choice with a lower probability interpretation, linedrawing problems at that level might require the Court to overcorrect, demanding a clarity of expression or purpose about which reasonable people would not disagree. Whatever its merits, such a standard goes well beyond the premises one might ascribe to a nondelegation canon. No version of the traditional nondelegation doctrine has ever presupposed that an impermissible delegation of lawmaking power occurs not specify the distribution against which the percentile was to be measured); id. at 1552-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding the statute to be clear); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596-97 (2004) (Souter,J.) (holding that discrimination "because of... age" is ambiguous and may mean either disfavored because of a difference in age or disfavored because of more advanced age); id. at 603-04 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the phrase is clear in context and takes on the "primary meaning" of difference in age). unless the statute addresses a point so clearly that reasonable people would not disagree about its meaning. 54 Indeed, if such clarity were required for constitutionally legitimate legislation, the resultant standard would prove impossibly difficult to meet, given the starting premise that some degree of ambiguity, and thus policymaking discretion, is inevitable in any statute. So understood, a clear statement rule would operate not as a (situation-specific) stand-in for the traditional nondelegation doctrine, but rather as a fairly prohibitive tax upon the legislative process-one that would take the form of incremental bargaining and drafting costs necessarily expended to move from the level of determinacy necessary for (valid) ordinary legislation to the unusual clarity demanded for legislation governed by a clear statement rule. 55 However attractive the nondelegation canon rhetoric may be, the justification for a clear statement rule must reflect the additional burden upon the legislative process that the requirement of a clear statement imposes.
A second phenomenon deserves mention: even a clear statement regime may ultimately slide from requiring a genuinely clear statement to something much more like boring, everyday interpretation. Here is why: a clear statement rule asks judges to do something they may find difficult. If all statutes have a latent ambiguity until interpreted, the judge applying the clear statement rule must apply all of the traditional tools of construction to see if the statute adopts the relevant disfavored result (such as preemption) in a clear and manifest way. If, having interpreted the statute, the judge concludes that the best reading favors preemption, it may be psychologically difficult not to conflate the best reading with a clear reading. 56 54 Of the traditional nondelegation doctrine, Professor Sunstein writes that "it is extremely difficult to defend the idea that courts should understand Article I, section 1 of the Constitution to require Congress to legislate with particularity." Sunstein, supra note 1, at 317. In the particular areas in which the Court applies nondelegation canons, however, the effect of a clear statement rule, successfully applied, would seem to require particularity-an explicit statement that Congress meant to disturb the particular value protected by the canon.
55 Framing any legal rule incurs the cost of obtaining and analyzing information about the rule's probable impact, and the cost of securing agreement among the participants in the . . . process. These costs usually rise with increases in a rule's transparency since objective regulatory line-drawing increases the risk of misspecification and sharpens the focus of value conflicts. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73 (1983) .
56 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 43, at 697-98 (arguing that this sort of "second-order interpretation" may be "psychologically demanding forjudges"). In a famous article, then-Judge Breyer predicted that the Chevron doctrine would be unsta2o08]
Although this point obviously requires conjecture, 57 this potential difficulty does fit with a phenomenon that many commentators have observed about the presumption against preemption (and about some other clear statement rules). In particular, it has become accepted wisdom that courts apply the presumption against preemption only spottily and that they often find preemption even in the absence of a clear statement. 58 Indeed, others have convincingly shown that preemption decisions frequently mimic the boring, garden-variety approaches to statutory interpretation that would govern in the absence of a clear statement rule. 59 One could certainly imagine a [S]uch a formula asks judges to develop a cast of mind that often is psychologically difficult to maintain. It is difficult, after having examined a legal question in depth with the object of deciding it correctly, to believe both that the agency's interpretation is legally wrong, and that its interpretation is reasonable. More often one concludes that there is a "better" view of the statute for example, and that the "better" view is "correct," and the alternative view is "erroneous." Breyer, supra, at 379. For a more detailed discussion of Chevron and its implications, see infra Part III.
57 T] he Court ... continues to simultaneously repeat and ignore the presumption against preemption."); Merrill, supra note 23 (manuscript at 21) (noting that "the presumption against preemption is honored as much in the breach as in the observance"); Nelson, supra note 23, at 298 ("The Court itself has applied the presumption only half-heartedly."); Sharkey, supra note 23 (manuscript at 110) ("I join a veritable chorus of scholars pointing out the Court's haphazard application of the presumption. In the realm of products liability preemption, the presumption does yeoman's work in some cases, while going AWOL altogether in others." (footnotes omitted)).
59 Along these lines, Professor Merrill has identified a number of cases in which the Court found preemption without invoking the presumption against preemption, even though the dissent argued that the presumption should resolve the case the other way. assign the full burden of uncertainty to those who would intrude upon the value protected by a particular canon. Judges, however, may tend to bridle at such a requirement; whether consciously or not, they may find it easy to confuse what they think is the most likely reading of a statute with a clear reading of a statute. If so, then clear statement rules-and the nondelegation principles they (over)enforce-may end up deteriorating into something that looks more like ordinary interpretation. If so, perhaps nondelegation canons are more trouble than they are worth. 63 Even if one accepts these concerns, however, Professor Sunstein's insight about nondelegation canons-which he carefully confines to the context of agency-administered statutes 6 4 -still offers an elegant answer to a question that has become pressing in administrative law: whether Chevron deference should be available in a case in which the 63 Of course, instead of calibrating degrees of ambiguity, one might try to implement nondelegation canons by eliminating particular elements of interpretation that facilitate interpreter discretion. At least sometimes, for example, the Supreme Court seems to rule out the use of legislative history to identify a clear statement. To be sure, some believe that a tool such as legislative history enhances an interpreter's discretion by permitting judges "to look out over the heads of the crowd and pick out [their] friends." Scalia, supra note 42, at 36 (attributing the quip to Judge Harold Leventhal). Others believe that legislative history confers no more discretion than other interpretive techniques-and may confer less. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1547 (arguing that sources of textual meaning may give interpreters no less discretion than legislative history); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 836 (1991) (arguing that reliance on legislative history may actually confine the open texture of statutory language). I have elsewhere suggested that some uses of legislative history do present nondelegation problems. SeeJohn F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 697 (1997) (making such an argument about the use of legislative history as authoritative evidence of legislative intent). If, however, one takes seriously the nondelegation argument for excluding such tools of construction, the rationale does not seem easy to confine to the sphere of discrete nondelegation canons. Exploring that complex question is not necessary to address the simpler claim I advance here: holding one's method of interpretation constant, it entails arbitrary line drawing to identify the level of background ambiguity at which statutory outcomes cross the line from congressional choice to executory discretion. Here is why: Chevron is a prodelegation canon. 6 6 Within its specified domain, 67 Chevron presupposes that when Congress has spoken unambiguously, a reviewing court-and the agency itself-must respect Congress' clearly expressed instructions. 68 If, however, the organic act is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the reviewing court must accept the agency's interpretation as long as it is "permissible" or "reasonable. ' 69 This two-step analysis is the flipside of a nondelegation canon. If an ambiguous organic act leaves open a question of policymaking discretion, 70 it is preferable in our representative system to assume that Congress intended to delegate that discretion to more accountable agencies rather than to less agency would always have to defend preemption decisions on the merits without the benefit of judicial deference. As Professor Sunstein argues, in matters governed by a nondelegation canon like the presumption against preemption, Chevron deference should therefore be a nonstarter.
75
Even though this conclusion about Chevron represents one judicially administrable implication of nondelegation canons, however, it ultimately falls short of a complete solution. The Court's refusal to apply Chevron would require an agency to defend a preemption decision on the merits of the underlying statutory analysis. 76 Looking at the question from the perspective of de novo review, a reviewing court applying the presumption against preemption would still have to determine whether the statute resolved the preemption question clearly enough to satisfy the nondelegation impulse implicit in the presumption. That inquiry, in turn, would require court to answer these questions: Does the interpretation at issue reflect too much ambiguity to attribute it to congressional choice rather than executory discretion? And just how much is too much? As we have seen, from a standpoint of judicial administrability, those questions may have no good answer. 77 based on an interpretation of a regulation that it deems to be sufficiently ambiguous to warrant deference, the agency must be able to show that it has given the disadvantaged party specific advance notice of that interpretation. See (1944) , which directs judges to give an agency interpretation the "weight" warranted by "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. at 140; see Sharkey, supra note 23 (manuscript at 143-51). As discussed above, my sense is that if one were to take the idea of nondelegation canons seriously, the minimum requirement would be that reviewing courts decline to defer to agency decisions to preempt state law. See supra text accompanying notes 64-75.
77 See supra Part II.A.
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